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Kantian Approaches to Animals and Obligations 
Caroline Kropka 
ckropka@mail.umw.edu 
Over the course of Western philosophy, the animal has quite often been relegated to the 
sidelines, if not altogether dismissed. René Descartes, for example, considers animals to be 
machines, lacking in reason and intelligence and driven entirely by their physical components.1 
However, beginning in the late 20th century, there was a renewed interest in issues relating to 
animals in the humanities, including in the field of philosophy.2 As one of the most influential 
Western philosophers, a reinvestigation of Immanuel Kant’s account of animals is of particular 
interest because his moral theory is so influential to deontological ethics. I argue that Kant's 
division between animals and humans on the basis of rationality may be supported to an extent; 
however, it is still possible and preferable for us to interpret his ethical theory such that animals 
are afforded some direct duties from humans, as such an interpretation is possible through the 
formulation of an alternative Kantian framework. 
First, it will be helpful to give a brief overview of Kantian ethics. For Kant, the highest 
and only good in a moral sense is the good will; in order to produce such a will, the faculty of 
reason is “absolutely necessary.”3 What’s more, this will must be good in itself, and not merely 
for its usefulness to us or as it is a means to some other end. This free will, which is the power to 
act according to principles, separates the rational being from the natural world.  
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Perhaps the best-known aspect of Kant’s moral theory is the categorical imperative. The 
most famous formulation of this concept is the Formula of the Law of Nature: “Act only 
according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal 
law.”4 Though this is sometimes misconstrued as saying to “act as you would like to be treated,” 
what Kant really means by this is that the principle upon which your action is based must be able 
to be willed as a universal law, as in a law of nature.5 What’s more, this moral law must be 
necessary for all rational beings and at all times. 
However, Kant also gives a second formulation commonly referred to as the Formula of 
the End In Itself: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 
the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.”6 By 
“humanity,” we take Kant to be referring to rational nature: in the preceding section, Kant writes 
that the nature of rational beings marks us out as ends in ourselves, as opposed to objects which 
have conditioned values and non-rational beings which have a “relative value as means.”7 This 
particular formulation is important because it gives us an objective principle from which Kant 
says we must derive laws of the will—all duties. This is also important because, as we will see, 
Kant’s specification of “humanity” and “in the person” seems to prevent a great deal of the world 
from having unconditioned value. By “humanity,” Kant is referring to the capacity to set oneself 
an end, distinguishing it from “animality.”8 
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How else does Kant distinguish animals,9 along with animal nature, from humans and his 
idea of humanity throughout his works? In the Critique of Pure Reason, there are relatively few 
references to animals. Where they are mentioned, Kant strongly differentiates between the 
animal and the human, generally regarding the animal as an inferior. His most important claim 
with regard to animals is that, because “lifeless, or merely animal, nature” does not have access 
to reason, it cannot have pure apperception.10 By “pure apperception,” Kant is referring to the 
faculty which unifies the sensory impressions into our experience, bringing it under one self-
consciousness. The consequence of this is that Kant must deny animals experience in the unified 
sense, since the pure unity of the apperception is necessary to organize the multitude of sensory 
intuitions into an experience that can be called one’s own and is the basis for the self.11 This, in 
turn, leads to the denial of many other faculties of mind to animals, such as synthesis and access 
to the understanding. 
 Animals appear more often throughout the Lectures on Ethics, with the most thorough 
discussion taking place in the section entitled “Of Duties to Animals and Spirits.” Here, Kant 
says explicitly that animals exist only as means and never as ends because they lack self-
consciousness.12 This means that, unlike fellow humans, we have no immediate duties to 
animals. Rather, the meager duties which we do have with regards to animals are only as such 
insofar as their situation is analogous to that of a duty we would ordinarily grant a human. In this 
way, Kant’s account of animals is differentiated from that of the Cartesian machine. Even though 
he insists that animals are driven entirely by outside stimuli and therefore have no freedom of 
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choice—even a dog we perceive as choosing to go after one target or another is simply 
responding to external stimuli, not coming to a rational decision—Kant does not deny that we 
should sometimes show animals compassion.13  
 There are also other ways in which Kant characterizes animals throughout the Lectures. 
Unlike humans, whose freedom is limited by “objectively necessitating grounds” inside the 
understanding, Kant says that the actions of animals are dictated by a subjectively necessitating 
fundamental principle.14 By this, he means that the actions of things in nature are regular and 
proceed according to an inner rule, while humans have freedom limited by universal rules. In 
this, animals cannot act in a way contrary to their inner principle, but humans can violate their 
grounds and therefore be acting immorally. In fact, Kant states that a human cannot be 
compelled to do anything without their willing it: even if some extreme stimuli is acting upon a 
person to get him to do something—Kant’s example being torture—the free will possessed by 
the person means he can still stop himself from acting immorally, and is responsible in a way 
that an animal is not if he does act immorally.15  
 In his discussion of the moral wrongfulness of suicide, Kant says animals are “here 
regarded as things,” while humans are not things and are therefore not something that can be 
disposed of. This also reveals quite explicitly that, to Kant, animals are distinguished as being 
lesser than humans. To treat oneself as an animal—such as by disposing of one’s life by 
committing suicide—would be to subordinate and disrespect one’s own humanity.16 It is also 
interesting to note that Kant treats suicide as not just reducing humanity to the level of animals 
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but “put[ting] himself below the beasts”; this is because the human being, by disrespecting her 
rational nature and using her autonomy to destroy that rational nature, is using herself as a means 
and violating her duty to herself in a way that not even an irrational animal would be capable 
of.17 
 With this characterization, we are left with a very complex view of animals. On the one 
hand, they are incapable of experience because they lack the capacity of understanding, and are 
therefore also incapable of cognizing beyond mere sense intuition. They go through life 
propelled by the stimuli which act upon them in a deterministic manner, unable even to make a 
decision about which stimulus to pursue. Kant explicitly refers to them as “things” and “means,” 
particularly utilizing these terms when characterizing humans as being superior to animals. 
Indeed, much of what Kant feels necessary to mention about the status of animals directly 
concerns our own morality, not theirs. The value of animal life, for Kant, appears to be quite 
contingent on its similarity to the human situation. In this, the proper treatment of animals is 
hardly dissimilar from the way we would treat a tool or a work of art, in that it would be bad to 
cause it harm not because it is wronged but because we wrong ourselves by disrespecting 
something reflected in our own nature (for example, utility or the appreciation of beauty). 
 Yet, for all Kant wants to use animals as the means to an end of uplifting the human, he is 
sometimes surprisingly sympathetic to animals. It has already been stated that he rejects the 
Cartesian view outright. Kant also calls medical experimentation on live animals “cruelty,” 
although he does allow this practice so long as it uses the animals as a means towards a “good 
purpose.”18 Interestingly, in the Lectures on Ethics, he refers to “how greatly [animals] care for 
 
17
 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27:331–334, p. 114–117. 
18
 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27:460, p. 213. 
 
6 
their young” as engendering our love towards them, suggesting that animals do engage in 
behaviors like caring, loving, and valuing one another.19 
 In differentiating animals from people, the most significant claim Kant makes is that 
animals lack the original unity of the apperception. In Kantian epistemology, possessing this 
apperception—the pure consciousness that underlies all experience as able to be called my 
experience—is necessary to unify the intuitions we receive through the senses into a whole. As 
beings who possess this apperception, humans have a consciousness of self, can form concepts, 
and can have the possibility of experience.20 As animals lack this unity, they also lack the 
capability of understanding, and can therefore only have access to the disorganized manifold of 
intuition.21  
However, when we observe animals, we see them quite clearly interacting with the world, 
navigating it in a way that is often quite successful. It seems that we observe them learning from 
the past in some way; they appear aware, responsive, and capable of evaluating their options. 
They appear to care for their young, just as Kant says, and they appear to form connections with 
humans and across species. Animals across multiple species have even been seen to manufacture 
and use tools derived from external sources, such as New Caledonian crows selecting and 
shaping sticks to retrieve prey from trees, in order to navigate problem situations in their 
environment. In such cases, we might conclude that these animals are displaying a form of 
reflective intelligence insofar as they are creatively, individually learning and “planning 
ahead.”22 Many of these behaviors are quite complex and do not appear to be wholly rooted in 
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instinct or stimuli responses. Yet, if we are to allow Kant’s definition of animals to stand, how 
can we explain any of this? If we are forced to deny animals consciousness, we must also deny 
them many abilities which seem crucial to being in the world.  
 What, specifically, must we deny to animals if we are to accept Kant’s view? Without the 
unity of apperception, animals cannot experience themselves as experiencing the world—at least, 
not in a way comparable to the experience of a self that humans possess—and do not have access 
to the understanding. As a result, they cannot synthesize intuitions under concepts, they cannot 
undertake judgments, and they cannot really have cognition of objects. As for what mental tools 
animals do have, they have sensible intuition, though with no apparent means of organizing those 
intuitions or unifying them. Kant also grants animals choice based solely on inclination, desire, 
reflection, and a form of imagination. This does not necessarily mean that animals cannot, for 
instance, have thoughts and intuitions organized by something, but that this something cannot be 
experienced by the animals as rules or laws or be subject to the animals’ judgment. Based on 
these limited tools, animals can have access to obscure representations—that is, a representation 
that is present but not cognized—as well as instinctive reflection, which lacks concepts but 
instead determines the appropriate inclination for their objects of sensation. In addition, animals 
might still possess an empirical awareness that is minimal and disunified but which does not 
prevent awareness of sensory intuitions on an individual basis.23 However, this all means that the 
Kantian animal can only participate in low-level mental activities and makes certain more 
complex behaviors, such as the aforementioned tool building, difficult to account for.24 
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 Despite the potential difficulties therein, I will proceed by accepting Kant’s 
distinguishing between animals as irrational creatures and humans as rational creatures, though 
alternate conceptions of the rationality of animals will be explored later. Kant’s explanations 
may make it difficult to attribute complex behaviors to animals, but I do not think he fails to 
explain how animals can have some type of experience, even if it is markedly different from our 
own. In addition, I do not think his account prevents us from finding some other way to ground 
these complex behaviors, even if it is not immediately apparent. Now, if we accept this 
characterization, what consequences does this have for the moral status of animals under Kant’s 
ethical theory?  
The Moral Status of Animals 
 In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant begins the section “On Amphiboly of Moral Concepts of 
Reflection” by stating “[a]s far as reason alone can judge, man has duties only to men.”25 And 
this is certainly one aspect of the scope of morality for Kant. However, the matter is not as 
conclusive as excluding animals from the moral sphere entirely. As we can glean from his 
characterization of animals, Kant does seem to think there are right and wrong ways of treating 
animals, morally speaking (for instance, by torturing them for sport). At the same time, the 
interests and welfare of the animal are not given any moral consideration by Kant. Instead, the 
status of oneself—a human being—as a moral being is the source of any duty.26 
 In order for a subject to impose a duty on another, Kant says, the subject must be a person 
in possession of a will, as only a will can be morally constraining. In addition, the subject must 
be given as an object of experience. That is, a duty must be between two existent people, though 
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Kant does not restrict us from theoretically also having duties to other rational non-human 
beings. Therefore, it is only possible for us to have a duty with regard to other objects that lack 
rationality and the autonomous will. However, we are apt to get this confused with the idea of 
having duties for them.27 Out of this amphiboly, we get duties with regards to non-rational 
things, but only as they are actually duties to ourselves. For example, we have a duty not to 
pointlessly destroy the beauty of nature, but not out of a duty we owe to nature itself. Rather, we 
have a duty with regards to nature, but this duty is still to a person. Even if the beauty of nature is 
functionally useless to us, we should not destroy it because, as destruction of the beautiful 
weakens human sensibility (though he specifies not directly our morals), we owe it to ourselves 
not to act in such a way. 
 Kant gives us the example of the English butcher not allowed to sit on a jury due to such 
activities “inur[ing him] to death.”28 His mentioning of this case suggests that the way we treat 
animals has a particularly significant impact on our moral sensibilities. Indeed, Kant says that 
violent and cruel treatment of animals weakens, even destroys, the predisposition that positively 
impacts our treatment of fellow human beings.29 However, this does not mean that causing any 
harm to animals violates a duty. We may use animals in our labor so long as we do not treat them 
poorly by forcing them to work beyond their capabilities, as the situation is similar to that of the 
human laborer: by mistreating our animal workers, we grow less sensitive to the suffering of the 
analogous human workers. Kant also mentions that we may kill animals, albeit with reason and 
with as little pain as possible.30 This means quite clearly that the medical researcher 
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indiscriminately experimenting on live animal subjects would be violating his duty not to the 
mice themselves, but to himself; in uprooting the moral character, he would become less 
receptive to the suffering of others and become apt to treat them poorly. However, it is important 
to note that it is not his duty to others that the researcher is violating, even if he is making 
himself less receptive to the suffering of others: it is his duty to himself that he must uphold, and 
in doing so, cultivate his rational nature. 
 I find two potential difficulties to note here. First, Kant mentions only two examples of 
situations with regard to animals in this section: use of animals in labor and the killing of animals 
in general. The former seems, on the surface, quite obviously analogous to the human situation. 
It is all right to treat human workers well, and it is wrong to make them suffer, for a multitude of 
reasons. Therefore, accepting the premise that treatment of animals does impact our disposition 
and further treatment of people, it seems to make sense for us to say that we can use animals for 
labor just as we do humans, provided that we treat them well too.  
However, what human-specific situation could possibly be held as an analogy for killing 
an animal where the action was not clearly morally forbidden? Kant does specify that the 
morally permissible killing is one in which the animal was killed as painlessly as possible. 
Though he does not here in the Doctrine of Virtue explicitly mention that the animal must be 
killed for a good reason, we might glean from his abhorring the behavior of the scientist torturing 
animals out of “mere speculation” that this killing also needs to be for a good enough reason, 
which is difficult to quantify.31 Again accepting his premise that treatment of animals impacts 
our moral behavior with respect to humans, it seems clear why we do not want to allow 
indiscriminate murder and torture of animals: it will dull our sensitivity to suffering in people, 
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make us apt to cause those around us to suffer, and degrade the value we place upon life. But 
then why must we allow killing to be morally permissible at all? What reason counts as good 
enough? 
The situation Kant gives us is as such: we kill an animal, taking its life in an act of 
violence. If we do this for a good reason, quickly, and with as little suffering as possible caused 
to the animal, we have not violated our duty to ourselves; our disposition of sensibility has not 
been damaged.32 But why are we, as he puts it, “authorized” to do this? If we are taking the 
animal to be analogous to the human, is there really no “shared feeling” of suffering that reminds 
us of the suffering of a fellow human? The closest equivalent for humans (aside from explicit 
murder) would be euthanasia, which would certainly not be morally permissible under Kant’s 
ethics because it denigrates the value of human life. What’s more, Kant clarifies this view by 
saying of the scientist experimenting on animals, if he puts the animals through pain “when the 
end could be achieved without these [agonizing physical experiments],” it is morally 
despicable.33 
In my reading, this could lead us to two different conclusions. Maybe the killing of the 
animal for food must not be analogous to a way of treating humans (at least not strongly enough 
to affect our shared sense of suffering) if we are to call it morally permissible. Perhaps we can 
say that because a human being is not commonly accepted to be a source of food for other 
rational beings; when the animal becomes a food source, it becomes completely like an object 
which we cannot see our rational nature mirrored in.34 And yet, what might this lead us to 
conclude about certain cruel ways of treating animals? For example, what about a situation like 
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factory farming? In the egg industry, male chicks (which are not the same breed as chickens bred 
for their meat, and are therefore useless) are culled at a day old, often through maceration 
(grinding up) or gassing. It could be argued that there is no situation analogous to this for 
humans, as human beings do not produce eggs which are edible and nourishing and could never 
serve as such a constant source of nutrition in the same way. What’s more, the chicks actually do 
not have a place in the world in a way that humans never could; they are bred en masse for one 
specific purpose, and when they cannot fulfill that purpose, there is no other place for them to go. 
But this does not seem acceptable, since the chicks as sentient creatures share so many 
characteristics with humans that they must, on some level, appeal to that shared sense of pain in 
a way that inanimate objects cannot. 
The other possibility is that the situation, analogous or not, must provide a reasonable 
benefit that cannot be achieved without the unfortunate suffering of the animal, as in the scientist 
experimenting on the mouse. If this is the case, most of the common ways we kill animals might 
end up being forbidden, since in current societies, alternatives to animal products like meat and 
fur are not only widely available but are also able to serve as adequate substitutions. Returning to 
the Lectures, Kant gives us the example of the butcher and doctor becoming inured to death.35 If 
merely becoming accustomed to death, even with good reason (killing an animal for food) or 
apparently by accident (even best efforts cannot save some patients from dying), is potentially 
enough to damage our moral sensibilities, why would it not be a violation of our duties to man to 
kill animals at all when there is an alternative option available? It seems that exhibiting such 
cruelty towards animals—beings which react to mistreatment with pain, fear, and attempted 
escape to preserve their own lives, rather analogous to how a human being would respond—
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would be enough to desensitize us to human suffering if we are to accept the previously-
mentioned premise.  
 The second major objection here is that this does seem needlessly heartless towards the 
animals. For Kant, the duties we have for animals are entirely contingent upon their effect upon 
us. If I shoot my dog for no reason, the only being who is harmed by this is me, the rational being 
who has failed to cultivate my humanity. My dog does not matter in the situation at all except 
that his situation happened to be one which meant my actions harmed me. However, if we do 
wish to take a Kantian ethical approach that places some value in the animals themselves, rather 
than their being a sort of conduit for human moral values, it seems that the text does not easily 
lend itself to this. As a result, we must ask ourselves a new question: can we interpret Kant’s 
moral philosophy to give us duties to animals, and to what extent can this be done?  
 There is one interpretation of Kant’s ethics with regards to animals that we can quickly 
dispose of. That is, the idea that Kantian ethics completely disregard any sorts of duties 
concerning animals due to their status as irrational creatures is weak. While discussions of 
animals are rather brief throughout these writings, Kant does not appear to be saying that animals 
are entirely outside of the scope of morality, as we have seen above.  
The Indirect Duties Interpretation 
 If we wish to say that humans have only indirect moral duties to animals under Kant’s 
ethics, this reading is commonly referred to as the indirect duties interpretation. When Kant 
distinguishes between duty to a being and duty with regard to a being, the former is called a 
direct duty and the latter is an indirect duty. With regard to animals, then, we have only indirect 
duties because only rational beings’ wills can bind the wills of other rational beings.  
 
14 
 In the Doctrine of Virtue, as he is detailing the division of relations of rights of duty, Kant 
says the only type of relation of obligation with actual members is the relation humans have 
towards beings with both rights and duties—that being, of course, the relation of humans towards 
other humans. For Kant, the relationship of humans towards animals falls into the category of 
humans towards beings with no rights nor duties; this relationship is empty because beings with 
no rights or duties are necessarily lacking reason and can therefore not be bound by obligation or 
bind humans by obligation.36 
The indirect duties interpretation is characterized by some as a moderate position on 
animal ethics. Nelson Potter’s reading, for example, places Kant’s interpretation at the middle 
ground between the strong view and the Cartesian view, where Kant does not force us to be 
“moral vegetarians” but does not treat animals as machines either.37 As we have discussed 
earlier, Kant provides us with numerous examples of ways in which he believes we should and 
should not treat animals. Taking the indirect duties view, then, does not allow us to torture and 
overwork animals at our own discretion, though it does base the moral wrongness of such cruelty 
in contingent facts about human psychology.38 At the same time, the indirect duties view gives 
us the ability to engage in practices that kill, harm, or otherwise violently use animals so long as 
they do not degrade our rational nature or sentiment. Raising an animal for a good reason, such 
as to provide sustenance, and killing him quickly and painlessly (presumably after treating him 
well prior to the killing, too) is permissible morally by Kant, implying that this is not such a use 
of animals that it would harm our character. We have respected the animal until the point it 
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stopped being an analogue for humanity and became something a human would never be: a 
source of food. 
In addition, scholars such as Lara Denis have argued that an indirect duties interpretation 
offers practical considerations. For example, it means we would actually have a duty to help 
animals, even indirectly. As all duties to animals would be indirect, imperfect duties, a 
misconception might arise that this means that a person could lead a morally good life while 
simply not fulfilling any duties with regards to animals. However, Denis argues that this 
misconception is untrue because it would make one’s own commitment towards the end of 
beneficence “questionable.” In the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant does specify 
that being beneficent when it is possible is a duty.39 Such duties of beneficence, though, are 
“wide obligations” because, willed as a maxim, maximizing the happiness of others at the cost of 
one’s own happiness would become a contradiction.40 Denis says that the indirect duties view 
actually broadens our view of possible situations to improve our moral character as well as urges 
us to promote the obligatory end of others’ happiness. This interpretation, then, actually 
encourages us to fulfill our commitments to the animals, especially when an opportunity arises 
wherein we would find it easy to give help to an animal.41  
More interesting is Denis’s assertion that these indirect duties not only discourage us 
from treating animals poorly, but also prescribe for us ways in which it is acceptable to use 
animals. Since we know we cannot treat animals in ways that will degrade our moral virtue, we 
can also understand which ways it is appropriate to have animals help us with tasks. The indirect 
duties interpretation would allow us to use animals for assistance (such as seeing eye dogs), 
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gather animal products like milk and wool if it is collected without harming the animal, and even 
clarify ways in which we may still morally allow some situations which would often not be 
permitted (such as euthanizing a mortally wounded animal to prevent further suffering).42 
Importantly, Denis also argues that killing animals at all, even in the morally permissible manner 
that Kant sets forth, weakens our moral sentiments; so does handling and butchering the dead 
body of an animal, citing Kant’s butcher inured to death.43 
Given this last claim, would it be possible to use the indirect duties interpretation to say 
killing animals is not morally permissible, in spite of Kant’s claim that it can be under certain 
circumstances? Denis goes on to give an interesting claim: if we are furthering the nature of 
rational beings in causing suffering to animals that would otherwise harm our sensibility, this 
does not override our perfect duties to ourselves as rational beings.44 Therefore, if killing an 
animal is necessary for the continued existence of our rational beings—for example, if the 
animal posed a threat to a human’s life—we would be morally justified in doing so. As for 
killing an animal and butchering it, if it is necessary (or close to necessary, such as if it is by far 
the most nutritious food source available) for the animal to be used as food for the continued 
existence of a rational being, then it will be morally permissible to use it as such, even though it 
still erodes the moral sensibility. This leads Denis to conclude that the indirect duties 
interpretation ends up denying us many ways of using animals. It is impermissible for us to kill 
and eat animals simply out of personal taste; there must be no better option available to allow us 
to continue existing as rational beings. We may not raise and kill animals for leather or fur unless 
we cannot live without these materials and no better alternative is available to us.45 Certainly, 
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Denis’s view is not a common way of approaching the indirect duties method and skews much 
closer to a strong view of animal ethics. However, to me, an issue still arises here: even if her 
conception is successful at morally disallowing a much greater amount of animal suffering, all is 
still vested in the person and not the animal. The animal is still worth nothing under this 
interpretation outside of its bearing on our sensibilities and rational nature. 
Nelson Potter raises a common objection in addressing the more traditional indirect 
duties interpretation. He notes that it is entirely possible that certain humans might end up falling 
outside the description of “having duties and rights” if they lack rationality. For example, 
newborns, people in permanent vegetative states, and people with severe mental disabilities 
might not be considered rational beings, though this is a controversial claim. If we follow Kant’s 
ethical system and conclude that we may not have direct duties to non-rational beings, this seems 
to place a significant number of human beings outside of the moral community (the kingdom of 
ends).46 This would not exclude rational humans from having indirect duties towards this group, 
of course, but Potter argues that this would allow us to have solely indirect duties towards a 
significant number of humans. The problem Potter finds with this is that it posits an entire group 
as being owed duties only incidentally, for “non-intrinsic” reasons: we have a duty not to abuse 
such humans merely because of their relationships to others, the effects on the agent’s moral 
character, and other contingent reasons. Yet this conclusion seems like it conflicts with the 
Kantian duty to have respect for humanity, treating both “paradigm animals” (a term which 
Potter uses to refer to a group of animals with nervous systems that humans live alongside and 
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are the “most promising… candidates” that we would potentially extend duties to) and such 
humans as mere objects.47  
One possible alternative that Potter provides is that we could base the requirements for an 
individual being possessing rights or duties on a more empirical approach. For example, we may 
observe that humans generally possess “human” capabilities like rationality, while no animal has 
ever possessed these capabilities. As a result, we may be able to regard as “human beings” all 
living individuals with human ancestry, thereby also giving them rights and duties based on 
having such a status.48 However, even Potter admits that this idea, being so empirically based, 
seems different from Kant's views and would be a significant alteration.49 Another alternative 
interpretation he offers is basing the extension of rights on the basis of holding interests. As 
Potter puts it, animals and humans seem to prefer certain states of being, environments, and 
situations, and do so in a way completely unlike objects and much more obviously than plants 
do. This interest could be the foundation, then, of extending rights to animals. In common 
practice, we even extend the idea of having a "sake" to comatose or deceased humans, as when 
we carry out their wishes past the point where they can be said to have active interests. In 
conjunction with Kant's idea of a passive citizen—who, unlike an active citizen, is less 
independent and will be extended a restricted set of rights—Potter argues that we can 
conceivably give paradigm animals some rights by thinking of them as passive citizens with 
limited "sakes," much like we would treat a child. In order to carry this out, though, we would 
need to not draw such an absolute distinction between the freedom of the human and the lack 
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thereof of the animal, requiring a drastically different framework.50 In addition, the idea of the 
passive citizen is in itself problematic, as it suggests that there could be certain groups of people 
who are similarly excluded from having rights, a claim disputed even at the level of treating 
children this way by Christine Korsgaard and others.51 
Another objection to the indirect duties view is that it relies on highly debatable empirical 
evidence.52 The reason we may have indirect duties to animals is out of the duty to cultivate good 
moral character and to avoid uprooting this sensibility. However, what evidence is there that our 
treatment of animals really does affect our moral character and, by extension, our propensity to 
treat people worse or better? In fact, this claim is entirely empirical; we can quite easily imagine 
a world in which this is not the case with no contradiction.53 If it turns out, in fact, that we really 
do not damage our moral character by shooting our loyal dog or torturing our laboratory mouse, 
does the indirect duties view conclude that we have no duty at all to abstain from such behavior? 
Similarly, if it turned out that certain human beings were severely lacking in empathy or 
otherwise not individually damaged in their moral sensibility by torturing animals for sport, 
would we be able to say that such acts were not morally permissible for them? It is even possible 
that we could find ourselves morally obligated to abuse animals if it turned out such behavior 
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J. Skidmore offers a further objection to the problem of the empirically based relation. 
Even if we accept as possible that there is a contingent relation between the treatment of animals 
and the treatment of humans, does the indirect duties interpretation truly hold that this relation 
can be the basis for the withholding of direct duties? Under the indirect duties interpretation, 
animals are given the status of objects or things, in the same category as rocks or plants.55 The 
supposed contingent analogous relation of treatment of humans and animals, then, is the only 
difference between beating an animal and beating a rock. However, we can see that the animal 
suffers from our violent treatment of it as a person would and not as an inanimate thing. There 
must be, according to Skidmore, a moral distinction between the suffering of a human and the 
suffering of an animal; the animal’s suffering is not morally significant, just as the damage we 
cause an inanimate object is not morally significant in itself, but the human suffering does have 
moral significance.56 
However, this presents a new problem: if there is a clear moral distinction between the 
suffering of an animal and that of a human, how can we then conclude that treatment of animals 
affects treatment of humans? Skidmore’s answer is that we cannot really. We know that 
destroying an inanimate object does not injure our sensibility; it seems that we could escape 
injury to our sensibility in the same way when abusing animals by applying this moral 
distinction, reminding ourselves that the animal’s suffering is morally insignificant just as the 
“suffering” of the inanimate object is. It cannot be that we simply are not sophisticated enough to 
grasp this distinction, as the distinction seems perfectly clear when comparing the abuse of a tool 
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with the abuse of a human. Nor can it be that we simply lack the ability to apply the distinction, 
Skidmore argues, because we generally do act upon the moral distinctions we believe exist.57 
A possible response to Skidmore’s objection is that we may think that certain types of 
violent behavior towards inanimate objects do degrade our moral character. Clearly, Kant 
himself did not deny that we have indirect duties for certain types of inanimate objects. He tells 
us that we have a duty not to destroy the beauty of nature, for example, as this “spiritus 
destructionis” uproots the moral sensibility.58 And while Kant does not go as far as to claim this, 
we might be able to imagine other ways in which treating inanimate objects improperly might be 
seen as contrary to the cultivation of moral character. For example, we might feel the obligation 
to water a dying plant, even if it is not a particularly beautiful specimen; perhaps if we view the 
plant with the relation that neglecting a dying plant is akin to neglecting a dying person, we have 
an indirect duty to humanity towards the plant to preserve its life. Though Korsgaard does not 
dwell on this point, she offers an example of our normative responses towards inanimate tools, 
deriving from an Aristotelian view of purposes and functions. Perhaps when we break a tool, we 
may view it as a disrespect for its functional utility—its nature as an object—relating back as an 
analogue of respect for innate human nature.59 Some of these are quite clearly not as opposed to 
man’s duty to himself as others. However, this is all to say that perhaps there is not as clear-cut a 
moral distinction at play here than Skidmore claims. 
The Direct Duties Interpretation 
The major opposing view to the indirect duties is the direct duties interpretation. Under 
this approach, Kant’s philosophy is interpreted such that we can really have duties owed to 
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animals. This is not as straightforward of a task as arriving at the general indirect duties 
interpretation; Kant’s moral theory posits the rational nature of humanity as its supreme practical 
principle, and this means that moral value apparently must be derived from rational humanity 
somehow.60  
One way in which we can attempt to ground direct duties to animals is by saying that 
animals do, in fact, have a rational nature. If it is necessary for the will of a rational being to bind 
our wills so that we have obligations to them, and it turns out that animals really are such 
rational beings, this would certainly place animals in the kingdom of ends. Kant certainly did not 
say that humans are the sole rational creatures possible—for example, there could be rational 
aliens—so perhaps he made a mistake in discounting the rationality of animals. 
In many ways, we operate on the presumption that other people are rational based on 
certain indicators. For example, we communicate complex ideas through language, we have the 
experience of being conscious of our own thought, and so on.61 If we have reason to believe that 
animals could at least be minimally rational, perhaps we should act out of caution on the 
presumption that they, too, have a rational nature. For example, Allen Wood argues that Kant has 
erred in taking his logocentrism to mean that rational nature is respected solely in someone’s 
person and never in non-rational beings related in certain ways to rational nature.62 In respecting 
rational nature in the abstract as well, we may extend respect towards animals and humans who 
are potentially, previously, or partially rational.  
If we are to take this approach, it seems that we can also rectify the issue with Kantian 
ethics leaving certain human beings out of the moral community. If we are to honor rational 
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nature as an end in itself, for example, we must respect the fragile potentiality for rational nature 
in children. To treat them as objects for rational beings or to fail to promote their grasp of this 
rational nature, then, would be disrespectful towards rational nature. The same holds for why we 
continue to have duties to deceased people or people in permanent comas: we must have respect 
for the rational nature that was formerly present, and so we continue to honor their wishes.63 
How does this extend to animals? Wood tells us that animals have desires, feel pain and 
pleasure, and take actions to pursue the preferences they hold (“preference autonomy”). These, 
he argues, are fragments which make up part of the “infrastructure” of rational nature. Kant tells 
us that an action towards an animal is morally relevant to us when the behavior, as well as the 
analogous human behavior, expresses the same attitude towards rational nature. In doing so, 
Wood argues, when we say that treating an animal poorly is morally wrong, we are saying so 
because we recognize that some analogous fragments of rational nature in the animal are being 
disrespected.64 For example, when I overwork the animals I am using in labor, we recognize that 
I am disrespecting the animals’ desire to stop and treating them as mere tools; however, these are 
qualities that can be viewed as analogous to humans because they are shared. We recognize that, 
like humans, animals have desires that can be frustrated; like humans, animals can possess 
qualities like loyalty and obedience that deserve to be met with gratitude and respect. Recall 
Kant claiming that we feel love even for the wolf as we see her care for her children: we see 
reflected in the wolf’s actions qualities of affection, devotion, tenderness, and so many other 
fragments which also belong to our rational nature, and in seeing this we understand that the 
wolf is like us in morally relevant ways.65 Perhaps we cannot conclude how far this rational 
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nature goes, but Wood argues that it is at least enough for us to value non-human animals for 
their own sake rather than our own. 
There are other arguments for the plausible rationality of animals. For example, James 
Rocha argues that behaviors which would ordinarily be taken as evidence for the rationality for 
human children may also be evidence for a sort of “minimal” rationality of animals who engage 
in the same activities.66 For example, when animals engage in play with rules, they are doing this 
not out of survival instincts, nor as an end set for them by nature, but out of setting “fun” as its 
own end. Rocha takes this, along with animals engaging in acts of revenge even when it places 
them in danger, as evidence of animals setting ends for themselves. Further, the seeming 
capacity of certain animals to hold grudges may be evidence that the animals, to some extent, 
have self-consciousness as they view themselves as having been wronged.67 Finally, animals 
engage in acts of altruism even when there is seemingly no benefit to them. In particular, Rocha 
points out instances of cross-species altruism, where the altruistic animal has nothing in common 
with the one it is assisting, as cases where it seems that animals are either setting a moral end or 
using reasoning to set an end not dictated by instinct. For example, in such altruism, the altruistic 
animal might be reasoning that the other animal might help them in the future, but independently 
of instinctually trusting members of that species.68 
The rational animal argument is compelling, yet flawed. I fail to see how merely feeling 
pain or pleasure is indicative of even a potential for rational nature, as such responses are simply 
reactions to external stimuli. Besides that, how are we to gauge whether animals truly feel 
“desire” in the same capacity as humans or if they are merely driven by stimuli to take the 
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actions that they do? For instance, we know that plants grow towards sunlight and into shade as 
needed; does this count as “desire” for sunlight or shade, or is it merely a survival response to 
certain stimuli? Plants, like animals, have circadian clocks modeled off their environment; these 
allow them to estimate time and reorient themselves even in the absence of the actual stimuli of 
sunlight, suggesting it is more than mere stimulus response at work.69 But the question remains 
unanswered as to whether we can call this “desire” in the sense that we desire as humans. The 
same goes for animals. We may think of a cat stalking its prey as “desiring” the mouse, but all 
the same this could just be the cat’s hunger and the sensory impression of the delicious mouse 
that is acting upon it and causing it to give chase. Yet, as some have pointed out, this could just 
as much be the case for other humans. I am aware, to the best of my knowledge, that I am free 
and have self-consciousness, but it could be just as well that I am the only one with this ability 
and the seeming rationality of those around me is really dictated by instinctual responses to 
stimuli.70 However, it seems a much less risky matter to conclude that other humans, who in all 
other respects possess similar physicalities, organs, general behaviors, and abilities to me, are 
also in possession of these prerequisites for rational nature. We cannot get inside the mind of the 
animal, even relatively, but for humans it seems we can get close to it through our experience of 
our own minds.  
Still, does this negate the argument that animals have the potential for rational nature? 
Even though the argument is quite limited since we cannot really conclude that animals are in 
fact rational, Rocha argues that the mere possibility still remains. In such a case, it is better to err 
on the side of potential anthropomorphism than risk continuing to commit grievous moral harm 
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to beings who really were, unbeknownst to us, minimally rational.71 Unfortunately, this case 
seems weak. First of all, as Rocha admits, it is unclear how to conclude what direct duties we 
would have to animals if we operate off the assumption that they are minimally rational. Clearly, 
we would have a moral duty not to do things like kill animals for mere enjoyment, overwork 
them, or otherwise show disrespect for their rational nature. One might note, however, that these 
were already disallowed under the indirect view. But would we still be able to treat animals as 
ends to some extent? If we are frustrating the animal’s desires to set his own ends by, for 
example, using him as a seeing eye dog, a tool to the end of assisting a person, is this morally 
permissible? Finally, and most importantly, this argument fails to account for the non-human 
world in its entirety having moral value for its own sake. Kant’s logocentrism still has us regard 
the entire natural world (outside animals, if we accept Wood’s and Rocha’s accounts) as having 
no moral worth or significance. Wood does attempt to rectify this problem by saying that, in 
regarding ourselves as the ultimate end of nature, we have duties to maximize nature’s unity and 
harmony as a teleological system for which we are the end.72 However, I note this only to say I 
still believe it does not adequately assign direct duties to nature. We humans are still posited as 
what gives nature any moral value. 
If we cannot ground direct duties adequately in the supposed rationality of animals, what 
other avenues are there? It seems that we may need to envision an alternative Kantian framework 
in order to do so. One of the most thorough attempts to do so comes from Christine Korsgaard. 
In a series of lectures that were eventually compiled into a book, she argues for a direct duties 
interpretation based upon her reading of Kant’s judgments about the conferring of moral value. 
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Korsgaard explicitly rejects the “rational animals” argument while also attempting not to 
place any of those potentially non-rational humans outside the kingdom of ends. She argues that 
animals perceive the world instinctively73 and teleologically, directly perceiving a world 
organized around their specific interests but not choosing their purposes as humans do. Luckily 
for some animals, they can learn and adjust their views of the world through intelligence. This is 
contrasted with the rational creature; rationality is grounded in self-consciousness, and this 
allows the rational creature to evaluate the reasons why they act and decide whether or not these 
reasons count as good.74 Essentially, an animal may choose the act it takes but does not choose 
the purpose of the behavior (even in intelligent action), but the rational being—the human—
chooses both the action and, as justification for taking said action, the purpose.75 For many types 
of marginal cases, Korsgaard argues that rationality is not a property but part of the functional 
unity of a being; therefore, people we might be inclined to label “non-rational” are really just 
unable to function as well as humans who do possess the properties which make rational 
functioning possible.76 At the same time, we can say that babies are rational because this is 
merely a life stage, as Korsgaard claims that rational nature belongs to a subject over its entire 
life.  
So if Korsgaard is concluding with Kant that animals are not rational creatures, how can 
she still derive direct duties from Kant’s writing? When Kant writes that duty is due to moral 
constraint by the will of the subject, he is saying that animals cannot obligate us due to their lack 
of such a legislative will. It is not that we do not have obligations because the animals 
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themselves lack moral value, but rather that they lack a particular kind of moral value—that of 
being an end-for-itself—because they lack the capacity to obligate.77 Out of this, Korsgaard says 
that Kant rejects value realism, or the idea that certain things have intrinsic value which makes it 
rational to desire them. Instead, the objects we desire have no objective value prior to our interest 
in them. However, as rational beings, we want to convince ourselves that we have the grounds to 
rationally pursue them. So we confer value upon the item, making this relation of valuing the 
source of those normative claims. Value, then, is a human creation conferred by the actions we 
take and which is necessitated by our own rationality, as when we act we are “endorsing” our 
grounds for acting and willing them as universal laws. In fact, even our own value as ends-for-
ourselves comes from our treatment of our own ends as worthy of pursuit.78 
However, Korsgaard argues that Kant makes an error in concluding that, from this, only 
humans can be ends-in-themselves. In fact, there are two senses of “end in itself” at play. One 
sense of an end-in-itself is the actual source of the normative claim to all rational agents; the 
second sense is the being who actually engages in moral legislation and thereby gives the “force 
of law” to the normative claim. The mistake, says Korsgaard, is that Kant is conflating the two 
senses. It is perfectly reasonable to conclude that animals cannot be ends-in-themselves insofar 
as they are irrational creatures and cannot be the source of the law or obligation. However, as the 
sources of normative claims, animals may very well be ends-in-themselves as it is still possible 
for them to obligate us in other ways.79 This is because, for Kant, moral law is universal; that is 
how he can introduce the idea of the passive citizen still bound by obligation and in the kingdom 
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of ends despite being unable to participate in legislation. So it is entirely possible that we can 
(and do) will laws that extend to animals, thereby affording them direct duties. 
Continuing on her line of reasoning, Korsgaard says that the best formulation to utilize 
when approaching animals is the second formulation—the Formula of the End in Itself—as most 
of the ways in which we interact with animals are natural (since they do not exactly share in our 
social conventions) and therefore are difficult to analyze through the first formulation.80 Social 
conventions are easier here because they can much more obviously contradict their original 
purpose, but laws of nature are harder to evaluate. Korsgaard argues that, just as Kant claims that 
the active citizen can legislate for the passive citizen, we as autonomous, rational beings can 
legislate outside of our moral community and confer protections on the non-rational world. 
However, it is not merely that we can say, for instance, killing animals is bad because we are 
animal beings and it is an assault on animal nature, because the normative “because” here is 
being presupposed. It is bad “because” we value our animal nature, taking it as an end and giving 
it normative value as such.81 
Korsgaard believes that we might be able to locate the value of being an end-in-itself in 
the choice to pursue the “natural good,” taking one’s natural inclinations as reasons for acting. 
For living beings, objects and situations affect their own needs. For example, even though we 
might say that a plant is not sentient, it maintains itself, and so on some level things and 
situations are either good for itself or bad for itself. Since animals not only maintain themselves 
but possess the increased capacity to experience and pursue the things that are “naturally good” 
for it—that is, good from its point of view—it seems that the animal also has a good that matters 
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to it. As a result, the animal pursues the good as the end of its actions, even if it does not justify 
to itself that its end is good as a rational being would. In doing this, Korsgaard argues, the animal 
matters to itself because it experiences its own good. Humans, as we are in possession of an 
animal nature, also have a natural good; since any normative value must be conferred to the 
natural good through our valuation of ourselves as ends-in-ourselves, we take our animal nature 
to be an end-in-itself. That is, we are valuing animal nature because we are conferring value on a 
natural good which is the same type as other living animals pursue. Even when we value human 
pursuits beyond the ability of animals, such as science, we are still valuing our animal nature: we 
are still experiencing and pursuing a natural good of life the same as animals do, only we are 
constructing “rational order” out of it.82 As we legislate that the natural good of an animal that 
matters to itself is the source of normative claims, we make animal nature to be an end-in-itself, 
and thereby give ourselves duties to the animals themselves.83  
Obviously, this is a much more complex argument than the indirect duties interpretation. 
However, it has benefits if we want to argue that animals have value beyond their impact on our 
moral character. For example, the problem of relying on contingent empirical evidence about 
psychology that plagues the indirect duties interpretation does not seem to apply here. For 
example, what if we were to discover that our treatment of animals had no bearing on our moral 
character, but we choose to take Korsgaard’s interpretation? As long as we are conferring value 
to the natural good of a being who matters to itself—which we do when we legislate with regards 
to our own natural goods—we are still conferring value to animal nature as being an end-in-
 
82
 Korsgaard, “Fellow Creatures,” 105. 
83
 Korsgaard, “Fellow Creatures,” 106. 
 
31 
itself, and so we will still have duties to animals no matter what. To deny this would be to 
disrespect our animal nature as an end-in-itself. 
One way in which I believe Korsgaard’s argument is successful is that, in attributing the 
value of something to its relationship of mattering, she gives us an avenue to say that things 
beyond animals as ends-in-themselves have value. For example, a problem we have seen with 
the indirect duties interpretation is that the whole of nature can only possess value indirectly 
through its effect on harming our disposition to sensibility. This creates difficulties in arguing, 
for example, that we have a duty not to destroy certain parts of nature. Perhaps it is easy to 
imagine that uprooting a centuries-old tree, or smashing a beautiful rock formation, is really a 
form of us practicing disrespect for perseverance, or agedness, or as Kant says, “lov[ing] 
something… even apart from any intention to use it.”84 But what about something that is not 
particularly beautiful or magnificent outwardly, something that might be more difficult to find 
“love” for, like the biodiversity of an ecosystem or natural processes that we might interfere 
with? Taking Korsgaard’s view, though, we see that there are living creatures for whom the 
ecosystem and natural processes matter, for whom the biodiversity or health of the ecosystem is 
a natural good.85 So there can be value in nature insofar as it is good for the creatures. Similarly, 
with this view we can see that non-sentient living things like plants have a good that is final 
because what is good-for the plant is explained out of reference to the plant, not to another agent, 
and can on some level they can be regarded as agents themselves.86  
However, in my reading, Korsgaard’s interpretation raises one very important question. 
We may indeed have found that we have duties to animals, but what duties are these? It seems 
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that we have at least duties of beneficence to the animals: Kant writes that “the ends of any 
subject who is an end in himself must as far as possible be my ends also, if that conception of an 
end in itself is to have its full effect in me.”87 What this seems to mean is that, if we are taking 
animals to be ends in themselves, we must not intentionally stop the animal from their pursuance 
of their natural good and must even help them when necessary. For example, it seems that we 
really would have an obligation to help an injured bird and would be forbidden from needlessly 
destroying its nest. Of course, as noted in the Doctrine of Virtue, duties of beneficence are wide 
duties, as our own ends might be sacrificed in respecting the ends of another. But perhaps when 
the part of our welfare we sacrifice is far less serious than the end that the other being is 
pursuing, this duty is binding to a greater degree. For instance, we should not be expected to let a 
hungry carnivorous predator eat our child, even if the predator is pursuing its “natural good” of 
food, as we would be sacrificing human life, the welfare of a child, and so on. But if we live in a 
situation where there are many sources of nutritious food aside from meat that would fulfill our 
dietary needs, or where we have alternative sources of warm clothing, perhaps we would have an 
obligation of beneficence not to stop animals from pursuing their own goods through raising and 
killing animals for their meat or fur (even if we would be happier for having eaten meat or 
having worn a leather coat). The disrespecting of animal nature, in this case, is much more 
severe since the only sacrifice we would be making to inflict this suffering would be on very 
weak grounds (the brief pleasure of eating meat, for example). Korsgaard even argues that this 
would be a grievous misuse of our rational dignity. 
Commentators like Altman, however, have raised the claim that Korsgaard’s argument 
also rests on contingent psychological premises: because animals value things like humans do, 
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animals have moral consideration.88 This suggests that, if they did not value things the same as 
humans, they would be just as morally irrelevant as they would become under the indirect duties 
view if it turned out that we are unaffected by animal suffering. But I think this is not quite 
correct. If animals did not pursue a natural good, and if the objects they act upon were not good-
for or bad-for themselves as they are for humans, what would they even be? As we have seen, 
something can even be good-for and bad-for plants as it relates to their purpose of self-
maintenance. Therefore, it seems like more than just psychological factors would have to change 
for the animal; the animal’s relationship to the world around it would have to change 
fundamentally before the animal stopped valuing and pursuing a good. Such a creature, for 
whom there would be no sense of good and bad for its own sake, would possibly be more like an 
object (or what Korsgaard calls an “artifact”). Of course, this is still contingent; the 
circumstances could conceivably be different. However, it is difficult for us to quantify whether 
or not what Kant calls our “predisposition... serviceable to morality” is impacted by animal 
suffering. 
The next potential objection to Korsgaard’s argument is that, by saying that animals as 
well as human beings can be ends-in-themselves, she is denying that there is any sort of 
difference in the relationship between two rational beings and that between a rational being and 
an animal. In fact, as Korsgaard is retaining the notion that animals are not rational and that only 
rational beings can have legislative wills, there is quite a big difference at play. As humans, our 
moral choice therefore includes others. In person-person relationships, there is reciprocal 
legislation that grounds our obligations: this means that when we make obligations to other 
humans, those claims we make must be reasonably allowed to be made on us as well. 
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Conversely, when animals make claims on us, it is because we recognize what we have in 
common with them—the animal nature and the fact that things are good or bad for them. So, 
when we legislate to animals, we do not expect that they will follow our moral laws.89 I find 
Korsgaard’s argument here to be intuitively strong. When I think I have the moral duty not to 
injure my cat, I do not expect her to follow my moral law and also not scratch me when I pick 
her up. I might want to call her a “bad cat” (in the sense that she is doing a bad job at being a cat, 
who I think should let people pick them up), but she is not a morally “bad” cat for not following 
the moral law because she lacks rational capabilities. On the other hand, if I wish to legislate that 
it is a moral law that I should be able to steal money from my neighbor, I could not reasonably 
do this because the nature of our relationship is such that he could make the very same claim to 
me. I think that this is reasonably how we tend to approach the difference between these two 
relationships. 
There may be a more serious objection to any direct duties theory, however. It might turn 
out that it is simply untenable for Kantian ethics to adequately give us direct duties to animals. 
For example, Emer O’Hagan argues that Korsgaard fails because she does not adequately show 
that Kant’s own arguments actually give us these obligations to animals.90 What Korsgaard has 
accomplished is only that she shows we may have a reason to honor the animal nature of the 
person, but that does not necessitate that this respect has to extend to the animal nature of all 
beings. The fact remains that animals do not possess a legislative will, so they are fundamentally 
different from humans under a Kantian view; the animals cannot legislatively respond in a 
reciprocal manner nor assent to moral claims because they lack rationality, so under Kant’s 
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system, we might be able to differentiate between their animal nature and ours. Kant’s principle 
of the autonomy of the will is so significant to his ethical account that we cannot dismiss 
consideration for this difference as mere prejudice. Thus, O’Hagan rejects Korsgaard’s claim that 
it is insincere to regard animal nature as having value only for humans.91 She also accuses 
Korsgaard of making a “category mistake.” It may be so that humans, as well as animals, possess 
a natural good, but we might think of the human and animal natural goods as merely descriptive 
claims. For example, from our point of view the natural good might include things like nutritive 
food and social interaction, often overlapping with the animals’ natural goods, but it also 
includes human matters like autonomy. For humans, our end is humanity, which may very well 
encompass those empirical goods like food and water that are essential to maintaining the body. 
When we will, we confer value on those parts of our own animal nature that are essential to our 
end, but that does not mean we must confuse this with the overlapping aspects of our purely 
descriptive natural good. The logocentrism of Kant’s system means that attempts to shift the 
grounds of moral value to the mere presence of animal nature, for O’Hagan, are weak and 
unjustifiable. 
O’Hagan’s objections here are quite strong, particularly if we do not want to revise 
Kant’s ethical system too much. Korsgaard’s reading does in many ways depart from the 
logocentrism that Kant adhered to, and I think it is hard to deny that animals are different from 
humans in a way far more significant than gender or racial divides among humans. But 
O’Hagan’s final claim, which is that it is all but impossible to ground strong duties to (or with 
regards to, for that matter) animals through Kantian ethics is not a conclusion I wish to accept.92 
 
91
 O’Hagan, “Animals, Agency, and Obligation,” 552–553. 
92
 O’Hagan, “Animals, Agency, and Obligation,” 554. 
 
36 
We can see throughout Kant’s writings that he did think certain ways of treating animals are 
needlessly cruel and morally abhorrent, that—even if it is only through us—animals do enter into 
our moral sphere in many ways. In some ways, his arguments seem even progressive when 
considering the time at which he was writing: for example, Kant gives consideration to even 
insects in his writing and condemns practices like vivisection. What’s more, because Kant 
protects animals through the perfect duty to oneself as a rational being, even if we do take the 
indirect duties interpretation, Kant is grounding this protection in the “highest category of 
duty.”93 In addition, our perception of animals has changed dramatically over time, as we now 
know that humans evolved just the same as all other species; in this way, we might understand 
rationality as not being a sacred power we hold, but rather the arbitrary product of evolution 
which could have also arisen in any other animal. It is untenable now to hold, as Kant does, that 
animals are little more than things with functional purpose for humans.94 And so has our 
mistreatment of them, with the growth of factory farming practices that raise animals in far 
worse conditions and treating them as mere objects to a far greater degree than ever before.95 As 
some have pointed out, the categorization of animals as “things” is contingent: throughout 
history, this category has contained not just inanimate objects and animals but children, slaves, 
women, and other groups of humans. Therefore, I think we should not turn away from revisionist 
accounts, even if they seem to reduce the importance of logocentrism in Kant’s ethics, in order to 
accommodate changes in the world and what we now know to be true of animals. In fact, I think 
this would help adapt Kantian ethics to a world that largely views animal suffering as morally 
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mattering for the animals themselves.96 After all, we no longer accept Kant’s active-passive 
citizen distinction, viewing it as arbitrary and baseless. Perhaps we might be able to see that there 
is a similarly baseless presupposition underlying Kant’s account of animals—that is, that animals 
are by their nature inferior to humans—and adapt his view so that it no longer rests on something 
unjustifiable.  
In addition, Korsgaard herself answers this objection in a footnote to her original lecture. 
To merely conclude we have reason to honor the human’s animal nature and not the animal’s, 
she says, would be insincere, a form of self-deception.97 The content of the legislation would 
continue to stand even if we were not rational beings, even though we would lack the ability to 
legislate. If we legislate against torture, mistreatment, and other behaviors on the basis of animal 
nature having value, it is irrelevant to the legislation whether that animal nature resides in a 
rational being or not. This is because the moral law is universal for Kant. As Korsgaard puts it in 
her reference to R. M. Hare, if asked the question of whether we’d like to be tortured given that 
we have been deprived of our rational nature beforehand, can we really say it would no longer 
matter? Korsgaard believes the answer is no: in both cases, animal nature exists as an end-in-
itself and has a value. To say otherwise is to say arbitrarily that animal nature only has value in 
particular cases and not as an end-in-itself. 
Conclusion 
I believe it is clearly extremely difficult to find an avenue to ground strong moral 
consideration for animals in Kantian ethics, particularly if we want to resist a potentially 
revisionist account. However, it seems that Kant did want to give us certain moral considerations 
to animals, and so it is important for us to determine just how far these moral considerations go. 
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The indirect duties interpretation fails on a number of grounds, in my view: it relies too heavily 
on analogy and contingent psychological evidence, and the attempts to coherently ground 
stronger duties to animals like moral vegetarianism cannot be satisfactorily justified because it 
still fails to place any value in the animals themselves. But I think it would be a disservice to 
Kantian ethics to conclude that it simply cannot adapt to accommodate stronger duties to 
animals. While Korsgaard’s attempt to ground moral value in the pursuit of the natural good is 
certainly not perfect, I think it offers us an intriguing way to explore different avenues for 
conferring moral consideration to the animals themselves. This view properly notes that there is 
a difference in how humans relate to each other as rational beings and how we relate to animals. 
In addition, solving some issues regarding animals in the way Korsgaard does also allows us to 
address certain overlapping problems, such as marginal cases, our valuation of the rest of the 
natural world, and even the degree to which our duties to non-rational beings extend. In any case, 
I believe that adopting some sort of direct duties interpretation would be crucial for a continued 
investigation of Kantian ethics in a modern world. 
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